The Changing Dimensions of Japanese Security Issues by Piper, W. Stephen
The Changing Dimensions of 
Japanese Security Issues 
 
By: W. Stephen Piper 
 
Date: August 1999 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
Presentation on post-Cold War security issues and international relations in Japan. 
Delivered to the Japan Industry and Management of Technology Program (JIMT) at The 
University of Texas at Austin on August 11, 1999. 
 
Keywords: national security; international relations; Japan 
 
 
IC² Institute Working Paper WP-1999-08-11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© IC² Institute, The University of Texas at Austin 
http://ic2.utexas.edu 
The Changing Dimensions 
of Japanese Security Issues 
by 
W. Stephen Piper 
President 
Piper Pacific International 
IC2 Institute- IlMT Series Working Paper 
August 11, 1999 
Japan Industry and Management of Technology (JIMT) Program 
IC2 Institute 
The University of Texas at Austin 
2815 San Gabriel 
Austin, TX 78705 
Working paper # 99-08-11 
Portions of this paper may be reproduced as long as full acknowledgement of the source 
is made. This paper may not be reproduced in its entirety without the written permission 
of the IC2 Institute and the author. 
The Changing Dimensions of Japanese Security Issues 
by 
W. Stephen Piper 
Prepared for Presentation 
August 11, 1999 
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at the University of Texas 
Less dramatic perhaps, but no less significant than in Europe, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and consequent end of the Cold War has had a 
profound effect on security issues and relationships in Japan and the 
surrounding region. 
The 21st Century dawns in Asia with the need to accommodate an 
ascendant China, much as the 20th Centwy dawned with the need to deal with 
the expansion of Japanese international aspirations. 
• How will we evolve the bilateral US-Japan relationship into a multilateral 
regionai security framework? 
• How we will accommodate the conflicting pressures of regional burden-
sharing and national determinism? 
These are questions for security policy - and for our technology and trade 
policies. 
It is very much a pleasure for me to be with you this evening to discuss 
these issues. 
Much of the history of the 20th Century - certainly the course of the frrst 
half of this century - was determined by how the established powers at the 
dawn of the 20th Centwy dealt with the aspirations of the newcomers on the 
international scene - I'm thinking here primarily of the emergence - or 
expansion - of Germany and Japan as nations onto the world stage. 
And the histocy of the second half of the century has centered on the role 
of another emergent power on the world scene - the Soviet Union - and the 
consequent Cold War. 
In a Japanese context 
• the first part of the century was about Japan's economic securtty, and 
Japan's rise as a world power, and 
• the second half of the centucy was about Japan's role in the world, 
and even in Asia, as a partner with the United States - but a junior 
partner, playing only a supporting role - a junior partner of the 
United States in the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union, 
and with China. 
Japanese foreign policy in the second half of this century was relatively 
simple as long as the United States provided clear leadership. Japan's choice 
was basically to follow the U.S. course, not only taking advantage of the 
nuclear umbrella we provided, but also following the policies set in Washington 
- often set in Washington with little or no consultation regarding Japanese 
feelings. 
At the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, there was sufficient uncertainty 
in Tokyo as to the desired policy response, that the affable, but indecisive 
Prime Minister Kaifu was given the nickname by some Japanese: "Bush 
phone." When in doubt, push the touch-tone button to connect with President 
Bush in Washington to get guidance. Indeed, hours after Iraq's invasion 
began, Prime Minister Kaifu convened a meeting of his National Security 
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Council - and pointedly did not invite his Defense Minister, lest he give rise to 
suspicion of a Japanese military response. 
However, in the past decade, there have come to be advocates in the Diet 
of a Japan's becoming a "normal nation" - a sovereign state with its own 
foreign policy objectives, and programs, and its own and more independent 
military capability. The support for a "normal nation" posture has only 
increased since the August 31, 1998, North Korean Taepo-Dong missile firing 
- a seminal event in terms of Japanese security policy. 
You may recall that our former Secretary of State, James Baker, wrote 
sev~ral years ago along these lines in the journal, Foreign Affairs, when he 
addressed how the United States and Japan should deal with each other in our 
relationship. He said that we must each change our way for looking at each 
other: 
From 
To 
• as a parent looking down to a child, and as a child looking up to 
a parent. 
• a level eye-to-eye, adult-to-adult relationship. 
So we must! And so we are - but it is uncomfortable or awkward, so 
accustomed are we to the leader-follower relationship pattern. 
Let's consider this parent-child or adult-adult analogy a bit- because it 
is part of my thesis that one of the changing dimensions of Japanese security 
policy is that Japan is no longer the "child" looking up to (and following the 
lead of) the U.S. "parent." 
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When we face issues such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, or the South 
Asian nuclear weapon and missile competition between India and Pakistan, or 
North Korean nuclear issues, it is certainly convenient for us when allies and 
friends simply follow our lead. That might be acceptable, at least to us, when 
we are indeed giving strong leadership. 
But what are our better interests when, for whatever reason, the United 
States is not able to or does not exercise good, strong, effective leadership. 
Should we wish that our allies drift along with us in indecision and 
ineffectiveness? Or is it better - and better for usf - if they act on their own 
- ~hawing initiative, while hopefully consulting with us. 
With the end of the Cold War - an era in which the United States clearly 
had the dominant leadership role - we more or less agreed - did we not? -
that the United States could not be, should not be the world's policeman? (Of 
course, perhaps, sometimes we try now to act too much as the world's 
policeman.) 
We should assert ourselves when our vital interests were at stake, but we 
should not expect ourselves, nor should others expect us, to shoulder 
responsibility for all crises or conflicts worldwide. Joseph Nye, Dean at 
Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, and former Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, writes on "Redefming the National Interest" in the current issue in 
Foreign Affairs. 2 
2 He writes: William Perry and Ashton Carter have recently argued that we should rethink 
the way we understand risks to U.S. security. At the top of their new hierarchy they put "A 
list" threats like that the Soviet Union once presented to our survival. The "B list" features 
imminent threats to U.S. interests - but not to our survival- such as North Korea or Iraq. 
The "C list" includes important "contingencies that indirectly affect U.S. security but do 
not directly threaten U.S. interests": "the Kosovos, Bosnias, Somalias, Rwandas, and 
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We should make our own policies, and exercise our strong leadership. 
But are we not better off when we can have the effective partnership of strong 
allies, making their own analyses and working in partnership with us? As 
adult partners? That is a role Japan is now to play as we go into the 2l8t 
Century. That's an aspect of the changed dimensions of security policy that we 
should welcome. 
Security Issues - Political Dimensions 
Thinking in dimensional terms, we might describe Japan's security 
pol~cy. until recently, as one-dimensional. As I said a few minutes ago - a 
"follow the U.S." policy. Remember, during the Cold War, our policy in 
Northeast Asia was indeed linear. At one end (or pole) of our line, there was 
the Soviet Union with its Pacific Ocean outposts, and its continued occupation 
of the Japanese islands it had seized in the last week of the Second World War. 
And at the other - the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet -and the U.S. Fifth Air Force 
and the Third Marine Expeditionary Force based in Japan, and supported by 
the Japanese Self-Defense Force. And of course, the Eighth U.S. Army in 
Korea. 
Indeed, U.S. foreign and security policy in Asia has been on a bilateral 
basis. The U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship, the U.S.-Korean bilateral 
relationship, the U.S.-China bilateral relationship, with a Taiwan dimension. 
Haitis." 
Joe Nye's reference to Perry and Carter, is to their new book "Preventive Defense," 
published by the Brookings Institution. 
Please recall Ambassador Mansfield's oft quoted characterization of the 
U.S.-Japan relationship as our most important bilateral relationship, bar none. 
The emphasis on bilateralism was most evident last summer when 
President Clinton over-flew both Japan and South Korea, the two cornerstones 
of our Asian security interests to visit China for nine days - kind of a working 
vacation it seemed to many. The White House permitted, if not invited, the 
Chinese to script the visit of the U.S. President, taking most reasonably great 
delight in having an entire nine-day trip focused exclusively on the People's 
Republic of China. What President ever visited the Soviet Union without 
majting at least one stop in the United Kingdom or in Bonn, Brussels or Paris, 
en route! 
This over-flight - or oversight - was viewed in Tokyo - to borrow from 
some trade terminology- not as "Japan bashing," but as "Japan passing." In 
Tokyo, it was interpreted as a clear sign that U.S. policy under President 
Clinton was putting higher value on China, than on Japan. 
Many in Tokyo saw the Clinton policy, which had continued the bilateral 
structure of the Cold War relationships, as a zero-sum game. The more we 
engaged China, the less we cared about Japan. That need not be the case, but 
it was seen that way. Should we be surprised that Japan views us differently 
at the end of the 90's from their view at the beginning of the decade? 
Influential Japanese are asking: "Can we rely on the United States?" Can the 
United States be, should the United States be, the cornerstone of Japanese 
foreign policy and security policy? 
Shortly after becoming President, President Reagan met with Japanese 
Prime Minister Suzuki to discuss strengthening Japan's contribution to the 
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common defense effort vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. This led to an increased 
Japanese role in sea lane defense, out to 1000 miles. 
The principal security policy issue for the past three years has been the 
so-called "Guidelines" for Japan-U.S. military force cooperation in the post-
Cold War era. In 1997, Japan and the United States agreed on a series of 
guidelines for how Japan would assist the United States in the case of potential 
regional crises through activities such as search and rescue operations, 
inspections of foreign ships, evacuation of non-combatants, and "rear-area 
support" roles such as transportation and medical care. 
Before these guidelines could become effective, the Diet had to approve 
three bills 
1) Revision of the Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement: This allows for 
mutual cooperation not only in peacetime, but also in time of crisis or 
war. 
2) The Regional Crisis Law: This obliges civilian agencies and authorities to 
provide rear-area support to U.S. forces. 
3) Revision of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Law to allow the SDF 
to provide logistical and direct rear-area support in crisis or war. 
These bills were submitted to the Diet in April 1998 by then-Prime 
Minister Hashimoto, but were not passed until Prime Minister Obuchi argued 
strongly for their adoption on the eve of his May 1999 state visit to 
Washington. 
Although, the new Defense Guidelines have been developed as a bilateral 
issue, there is certainly a multilateral dimension - as the key element of the 
new Guidelines is that the Japanese SDF are now able to assist U.S. forces in 
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the Far East - a functional description that, intentionally. was left 
geographically vague. 
Indeed, Prime Minister Obuchi has deemed it necessary to explain the 
new guidelines to both China and Korea, arguing that they are focused on 
enhanced regional stability, do not represent increased Japanese militartsm. 
These guidelines will strengthen the bilateral U .S .-Japan 
military/security working relationship - but there is also a multi:..lateral 
dimension. They clearly anticipate a broader regional securtty partnership. 
We now have Japan engaged with us in dealing with Korean peninsula 
secµrity and stability issues. The U.S.-Japan-South Korea are consulting on 
these responses to North Korea's actions. 
There is increased Japan-Taiwan dialogue, and prospects for increased 
naval cooperation among the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea 
- not aimed at anyone - but a cooperative effort to enhance understanding 
and stability. 
To say that our current relation with China are at a low point is an 
understatement. But Japan can play an important role in regional stability by 
building on her improving relations with China. And China is most important 
to us - North Korea's rising belligerency is only the most immediate reason. 
Taepo-Dong - Agent of Change 
I've already cited North Korea's August 31, 1998, firing of the multi-stage 
Taepo Dong missile over Japan - not into the Sea of Japan, but actually over 
the main island of Japan to splash into the Pacific Ocean - as a seminal event 
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in Japanese security policy. Other adjectives that come to mind are 
"crystallizing," or "galvanizing." 
Diet leader Ozawa had several years before called for Japan to be a 
"normal nation," and Japan had been witnessing the Clinton Administration's 
flirtation, if not fixation, with engagement of China, and judging this China 
initiative as a diminution of Japan's position vis-a-vis U.S. foreign policy. 
To a great extent, the Japanese public has not been pre-occupied ·or even 
engaged with security policy issues. The Japanese constitution renounces war 
as an instrument of foreign policy. Japan maintains a small, but expensive 
seU:-defense force at a cost of I% of GDP. The United States provides a nuclear 
protective umbrella. The Japanese Diet and people have been content to give 
little attention to security issues. Even Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was viewed as 
a distant event, not important to Japan. Not much public attention was paid 
to the Nodong missile firings into the Sea of Japan. 
There have been many, many politically/socially imposed limitations on 
the capability, or robustness of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. For 
ex.ample: 
1. Aircraft have no in-flight refueling capability. 
2. SDF units couldn't depart Japan to participate in UN PKO 
operations, until after lengthy Diet and public debate. Now PKO 
participation is accepted - almost routine. 
3. There was considerable concern as to whether the MSDF's mine 
sweepers should go to the Persian Gulf as a part of the Gulf War 
cleanup effort. 
4. Ammunition stockpiles are impressively meager. 
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But then the tide began to shift a bit with the Chinese intimidation of 
Taiwan in the Spring of 1996 fning of ballistic missiles into the Taiwan Straits, 
and the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. 
Then came the Taepo Dong - a shrill wake-up call - just about a year 
ago. Witnessing the Japanese reaction, I was reminded of our own national 
arousal with the October 1957 launch of the Soviet Sputnik satellite. Within 
days of the Taepo Dong launch, the Government, and the Diet, were studying 
the situation - and announced a program to build four reconnaissance 
satellites within four years so that "Never again would Japan be smprised" by 
suc;h an action of a neighbor. 
Senior levels at MoFA supported a Japanese indigenous or nationalist 
solution because the meandering of what passes for policy in the Clinton 
Administration had left them with the conclusion that important as the United 
States is in Japanese foreign and security policy. Japan needed independent 
capability. · 
As with Sputnik, the public and political understanding was not quite in 
accord with the actual facts . 
• We did have advance warning of the Taepo Dong launch from our 
reconnaissance satellites- but that fact was not publicized. 
• We had shared this information with the Japanese Government - but 
that fact was not publicized. 
• The U.S. Seventh Fleet and the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force 
had deployed ships to track the missile after launch. 
• In fact, the Japanese Aegis destroyer, Miyako, was on station, together 
with ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Miyako detected and tracked the 
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Taepo Dong, first stage separation and debris, and the second stage 
separation and debris. 
Now it is true that there is no Japanese or U.S. capability to shoot down 
a Taepo Dong over the Sea of Japan. 
For the past six years or so, the Navy has been developing both lower tier 
and upper tier ballistic missile defense capability, based on our existing fleet of 
Aegis cruisers and destroyers, and the Standard Missile. 
Last December, much to the displeasure of Beijing, the Japanese Cabinet 
took a decision to join in a cooperative R&D effort with the U.S. Navy on Navy 
Th~ater Wide Block II system, for which we envision deployment in about 2010. 
Japan's efforts to mollify China regarding the introduction of BMD 
capability has been much aided by North Korea's Taepo Dong. Last September, 
the "relief' among Japanese advocates of BMD was palpable; they almost 
toasted North Korea. In the Spring of 1997, the JDA Minister, in a private 
meeting, referred to the C2 problem he had with BMD - cost and China. In 
1995, when I was discussing BMD with Vice Minister of JDA, he was concerned 
that h e had no way to proceed - not politically correct" to say China nor 
Russia was a threat, and not credible to describe North Korea as the threat! 
Security Issues - Equipment Issues 
In the 1970's and first half of the 1980's, U.S.-Japanese military 
cooperation was supported by the foreign policies of each nation, and by the 
operational activity of our military forces - primarily air and naval. 
- 11 -
Japan has had a long standing policy often referred to as the "Three 
Prtnciples of Arms Exports" - which effectively said that Japan would export 
neither military equipment nor military technology. 
1. No arms exports to communist nations. 
2. No arms exports to nations to which the export of anns is 
prohibited by the United Nations. 
3. No arms exports to nations in conflict, or likely to become iilvolved 
in conflicts. 
This dates policy position to then-Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's statement to 
the Diet in 1967. 
One of the effects of these Three Principles was to preclude cooperative 
R&D. One-way transfers of military equipment from the United States to 
Japan were of course permitted, and Japan was a major customer for the U.S. 
defense industry. And one-way transfer from the United States to Japan of 
military technology, such as Technical Data Packages (TDPs) for F-4s, F-15s, 
Patriot, MLRS, C-130s, and many other systems were permitted. 
Under such transfers Japanese industry received the TDPs and did the 
production work. U.S. companies and their shareholders benefited from 
license fees and royalties. But U.S. labor saw jobs being transferred from the 
United States to Japan. Congress began raising questions. The sale of the 
Aegis weapons suite in the mid-80's narrowly passed in the Senate because 
many Senators wanted Japan to buy not only the weapons suite, but also the 
entire ship from the United States. 
In 1980, Bill Perry, then Under Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering, initiated a dialogue with the Japan Defense Agency that was to 
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lead to two-way cooperation. In 1983, the Japanese cabinet took a decision, as 
an exception to the Three Principles of Arms Exports, to permit the transfer to 
the United States of Japanese military technology "subject to detailed 
arrangements to be negotiated." 
We negotiated those detailed arrangements in 1985, and the Office of the 
Secretruy of Defense published them in Februruy 1986. In 1986 and 1987, we 
negotiated the procedures for U.S. origin applications for Japanese patents to 
be held in secrecy in Japan - as they are in the United States - if their 
publication would reveal sensitive military technology information. These 
pro~edures became effective April 1, 1988. 
There have been several transfers of Japanese militruy technology under 
these Detailed Arrangements, since 1985. But more importantly, they have 
permitted the FSX development program - a sometimes difficult and/ or 
unhappy experience. 
They have permitted Japanese companies to participate in the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) R&D program - whereby we could access and take 
advantage of selected Japanese niche technologies. 
In this entire area of defense equipment and technologies, there have 
been many U.S. skeptics. What technology does Japan have to offer us? We 
spend billions on defense R&D - and our systems are much more advanced. 
True! Japanese industry cannot match U.S. industry at the systems 
level - at the point of systems engineering and integration. But in enabling 
technologies 
- ceramic materials 
- gallium arsenide 
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- miniaturization 
- mass production of flat panel displays 
- certain areas in electro-optics 
- cryogenic cooling 
Japanese industry has much to contribute. They can be good partners with 
U.S. frrms to develop components, subsystems that we can use. 
It should not be a contest of national flags. Not at all. Many DoD 
technology assessment teams have gone to Japan with the expectation of 
finding nothing of interest. To their surprise, they have found much of interest 
- ~d to their credit they have returned to say, "let's work together." 
A number of people have asked me, "Why would we want to depend upon 
Japanese technology for our front-line military systems?" 
· First, I do not suggest dependence. Nor do I advocate economic 
nationalism. The late l 920's and the 1930's should still be a lesson in this 
regard. · 
Second, I want our systems to be the best possible - both cost · and time 
of availability are elements of best. 
Third, we spend a lot of money on R&D - not as much as we used to. 
But still a Iott And not as much as many researchers would like. Bringing in 
Japanese technology expands our research results, while we continue to 
conduct as much research in the United States, with our universities and 
industry, as the Congress and our Defense budget will support. 
Thus, my fourth point, is accessing Japanese technology does not reduce 
U.S. R&D effort but supplements it. 
And, Japan is moving more and more in this direction. 
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In the recently agreed program of Japanese participation in the NTW 
Block II R&D program 
- a Japanese company will have a major, if not a leading, role in the 
cooperative effort of developing a new, so-called "full caliber second 
stage motor" 
- a U.S. company will have the lead in the DACS development 
- Japan will lead in developing new nose cone materials 
- the seeker technology component will have companies competing for 
the lead role. 
This program is agreed. The diplomatic Exchange of Notes and the MOU 
are expected to be signed this Friday. (They were in fact signed August 16, 
1999, following Japanese Cabinet approval August 13, 1999.) 
International cooperative projects are difficult, much more difficult than 
single nation projects - two congresses, two bureaucr~cies. two schedules. 
The NTW cooperative program, however, has been crafted so that Japan 
supports our program, but cannot hold it up. There will be U.S. company in 
leader or follower position in each task - misapproach is also good for risk 
reduction alternative strategies. 
Many refer to the FSX program as a cooperative development effort. I do 
not. It was a Japanese development program against Japanese performance 
requirements. All of the funding, all of the requirements come from Japan. 
Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth, formerly General Dynamics, was a major 
subcontractor - and brought a lot of technology and experience to the 
enterprise. But it was a Japanese program, not a joint program. 
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The NTW BMD program - and others in recent years - eye-safe laser. 
ducted rocket engine, ceramic engine materials - have been truly cooperative 
- being jointly funded toward commonly agreed research objectives. 
This is a new dimension of Japanese defense activity in the past five to 
six years. And there should be more such cooperative efforts in the future. 
As we gain practical experience in working together, it will become easier to do. 
Re-Arming of Japanese Nationalism 
For the final portion of my discussion this evening, I have chosen the 
discordant, perhaps provocative, subtitle - Re-Arming of Japanese 
nationalism? I hope you can hear the question mark in my voice. 
I say discordant title, because there are currents for a definite 
strengthening of Japanese military/defense capability, and these are elements 
of nationalist approach. But I see no trend toward any threatening appearance 
of a militaristic approach. 
China is very much concerned. Taiwan Straits is a major concern for 
Japan. as for the United States - but they are closer, literally in the shadow of 
China. 
Korea and Japan have had a recent standoff regarding disputed islands 
in the Sea of Japan-but now are cooperating regarding KEDO. 
Japan's neighbors are very sensitive to resurgent militarism. And, while 
there is a strengthening of military capability, it is still very limited, and is not 
bent at all toward any style of military adventurism. 
There is debate today within the Defense Agency and the Government 
regarding a new cargo aircraft, a new maritime patrol aircraft. and a refueling 
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tanker program - each of which would enhance Japanese military capability 
and at least two of which would extend the Japanese militaiy capability in the 
region and support greater Japanese PKO participation. 
These three many wish to develop within Japan. One of the motivations 
is support for the Japanese aerospace industry, both design and production 
elements of the Japanese aerospace industry. 
Japan has the best air superiority fighter in the world (the USAF's F-15 
- produced in Japan under license) and the best guided missile ships in the 
world - ships built in Japan, but the Aegis mission capability and radar suite 
from the United States, and the Standard Missile also from the United States. 
Japan has the world's leading AWACS capability - the U.S. AWACS 
mission equipment suite, installed in a Boeing 767 aircraft. The USAF uses 
much older Boeing 707 aircraft. 
A number of key people in Japan wanted to build the FSX as an 
indigenous program.- It was finally agreed to have significant U.S. 
participation. 
The new Japanese tanker aircraft programs, if it proceeds, will most 
likely be based on the Boeing 767. 
It is not at all clear that the Japan Defense Agency will have the funds for 
both a new cargo transport aircraft (to replace the C- 1} and a new maritime 
patrol aircraft (to replace the P-3C). And it is unlikely that the USAF or Navy 
will be interested in participating in these airframe programs as they have no 
requirement or interest in such a new airframe. 
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Earlier I referred to last year's Taepo Dong firing as a seminal event in 
the arena of security policy. And it was also in the realm of defense equipment 
and capability. 
Japan has long been committed to the peaceful use of space, and has, as 
a result, had controversy as to the use of surveillance and reconnaissance 
satellites. 
But within weeks of the Taepo Dong, there was an agreed program to 
launch four multi-purpose satellites within four years - and one purpose was 
to watch for North Korean missile activity. But at the same time there was 
reluctance to call these spy satellites or even reconnaissance satellites - and 
the Defense Agency has had only a minor role in this program. 
How the satellite program will actually proceed is very much, pardon the 
expression, "up in the air." But a Japanese political requirement is that it be 
indigenous. And surely it will indeed be labeled an indigenous program and 
capability. This is a reflection of Japan's asserting herself as a sovereign state. 
Now, in fact, just how much U.S. content (in terms of components, or systems 
support) there will be remains to be determined. 
Conclusion 
To summarize - there are several changed and changing dimensions of 
Japanese security policy: 
• The U.S.-Japan security dialogue is "becoming more level." It is less 
and less: "parent/child, and more and more "adult/adult." 
• Japanese security policy is no longer linear - "follow the United 
States." Japan is developing broader regional relationships. And 
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Japan and the United States are cooperating with third nations in 
security activities. 
• Our pattern of bilateral relationships in Asia is evolving toward multi-
lateral efforts. 
• Japan's dependence on U.S. military equipment and technology is 
becoming less, as Japanese industry has more advanced capability. 
• Japan is now willing and able to undertake a reverse flow of military 
technology to the United States. 
• The U.S.-Japan security relationship has long been supported by 
policy and operational pillars; now there is added a 
technology /industrial pillar as well. 
• Japan, always a partner of the United States, in recent decades is 
taking on expanded, more equal partnership responsibilities - and is 
showing her own initiative in responding to regional threats. 
Japan's increasing capability and role in foreign· policy and regional 
security policy should be viewed, not as a challenge to the United States, but 
as an opportunity for the United States. 
I look forward to some discussion. 
Thank you again for the invitation to join you in Austin this evening. 
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